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Indigenous people are often seen as being the special situation in Australia and in 
discourse about law, in particular the Constitution, we tend to be treated as a special case. 
It is true that we are in a unique position in Australian society given that we are the 
original owners of Australia. It is true that issues of colonisation, dispossession and the 
implementation of assimilationist policies continue to place Indigenous people on the 
periphery.  
This ‘special category’ approach to Indigenous rights overlooks the very 
important and central role that Indigenous people can play in assessing the performance 
of our Constitution. I argue that, as the poorest socioeconomic group in Australia, and the 
most marginalised cultural group, Indigenous people become the litmus test of whether 
the Constitution and the system of governance that it sets up works. To put this test of 
democratic standards another way—if our laws and institutions fail the most vulnerable 
sector of our society, how effective are they? This is the question we need to ask 
ourselves when we look at issues of human rights protection under the Constitution.1 
I. Looking back 
Indigenous people provide a powerful example of this litmus test in the 1997 case 
of Kruger v. the Commonwealth.2 This was the first case to be heard in the High Court 
that considered the legality of the Federal Government’s assimilationist policy of 
removing Indigenous children from their families. The plaintiffs had brought their case 
on the grounds of the violation of various rights by the effects of the Northern Territory 
ordinance that allowed for the removal of Indigenous children from their families. The 
plaintiffs had claimed violations of the implied rights to due process before the law, 
equality before the law, freedom of movement and the express right to freedom of 
religion contained in s.116 of the Constitution.  They were unsuccessful on each count, a 
result that highlighted the general lack of rights protection in our system of governance 
and the ways in which, through policies like child removal, there was a 
disproportionately high impact on Indigenous people as a result of those silences.  
Ideologies of white racial superiority, prevalent at the time of federation, still 
continue to imbue the Constitution and the contemporary experiences of Indigenous 
people bear this legacy out.  
The issue of whether the race power (s.51(xxvi)), which allows the Federal 
Government to make laws with regard to Aboriginal people, could be used to deprive 
Indigenous people of their rights was raised by the plaintiff in Kartinyeri v the 
Commonwealth (the Hindmarsh Island Bridge case).3 In that case, brought in a dispute 
over a development site that the plaintiff had claimed was sacred to her, the government 
sought to settle the matter by passing an Act, the Hindmarsh Island Bridge Act 1997 
(Cth). That Act was designed to repeal the application of heritage protection laws to the 
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plaintiff. The plaintiff argued, inter alia, that when Australians voted in the 1967 
referendum to extend the federal race power to include the power to make laws 
concerning Aboriginal people it was with the understanding that the power would only be 
used to benefit Indigenous peoples. The Court did not directly answer this issue, finding 
that the Hindmarsh Island Bridge Act 1997 (cth) merely repealed legislation. The 
majority held that the power to make laws also contains the power to repeal or amend 
them.4 
The failure to answer the question has caused much relfection on the argument of 
a race power that can be used to infringe upon the rights of Indigenous people. Many 
were shocked to find that Australia’s Constitution could be read as offering no protection 
against racial discrimination but one need only look at the intention of the drafters to see 
why it remains this way.  
The drafters believed that entrenched rights provisions were unneccessary in the 
Constitution and that the protection of rights was the proper domain of the legislature (the 
legislature that can pass the Heritage Protection Act and then repeal it so it doesn’t apply 
to a particular individual—ditto the Racial Discrimination Act. 
Also, it was considered desirable to ensure that the Australian states would have 
the power to continue to enact laws that discriminated against people on the basis of their 
race.  
If one is aware of these attitudes held by the drafters of the Constitution then it 
comes as no surprise that the Constitution is a document that offers no protection against 
racial discrimination today. It was never intended to do so and the 1967 referendum in no 
way addressed or challenged those fundamental principles that remain entrenched in the 
document. It also shows how legislated rights can be withdrawn by the whim of 
legislature.  
Conversations about citizenship, cultural diversity and institutions, including the 
Constitution, in Australian society all raise questions about the assumptions of the 
‘settlement’ of Australia and about the contemporary relationship between Indigenous 
and non-Indigenous Australians. Here I want to step back from the legal document as a 
structure of government and look at the Constitution in its symbolic role.  
The issue of the acquisition of Australia by the British has become an issue of 
increasing and recurring discomfort in the debates about reconciliation, Indigenous rights 
and a treaty. The uncertainty about this issue has resurfaced strongly in the decision in the 
Mabo case.5 The High Court of Australia, in overturning the legal fiction of terra nullius 
refused to pronounce definitively on the issue of the British claim to sovereignty. Instead, 
it held that the legitimacy of the acquisition of sovereignty was an issue that had to be 
taken up in an international court. This was an outcome that has meant that questions 
concerning the status of the legality of claims to sovereignty remain unanswered, creating 
a grey area of law and an uncomfortable legal silence.  
The questioning of ‘settlement’ also arises in the context of the extent to which 
Indigenous peoples have been included in, participated in and given consent to the 
processes that have brought about the creation of the modern Australian state. In this 
context, much is rightly made of the fact that Indigenous people at the time of federation 
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were substantively excluded from debates surrounding the terms, conditions and visions 
of our society and their translation into our document of governance, the Constitution.  
The notion of ‘settlement’ also raises questions about the extent to which the 
colonisation process has really finished in Australia. The argument, stated quite simply, is 
that until steps are taken to rectify the historical exclusion of Indigenous peoples in the 
nation-building processes of the Australian state, our system of governance will continue 
to be a colonial regime. That is, it will remain a system of laws and governance imposed 
upon the nations that have lived in Australia before that dubious assertion of sovereignty.  
In fact, what the recurring appearance of this debate about ‘settlement’ shows is 
that these unstable and questionable beginnings of nationhood continue to raise 
unresolved and unsettled issues. The questioning of institutional legitimacy challenges 
assertions that we have moved into a post-colonial era. Instead, it views the power 
structures of the modern Australian nation as a continuation of its colonial legacy.  
II. Looking forward 
To rectify this historic exclusion, many have called for constitutional change. 
These claims have included: 
A new preamble to the Constitution: a Preamble is important because it sets the 
tone for the rest of the document. It can be used to give assistance in interpreting 
the Act that follows. Particularly in our Constitution, a new Preamble will offer an 
opportunity to articulate our shared goals, principles and ideals as a nation. If 
recognition of prior sovereignty and prior ownership were contained in a 
Constitution Preamble, courts may be able to read the Constitution as clearly 
promoting Indigenous rights protection, clearing up the unanswered question left 
by the Hindmarsh Island Bridge case.  
 
A Bill of Rights: As the Kruger case showed, very few rights are protected by our 
Constitution. Those that appear in the text have been interpreted in a minimal 
manner. Although members of the High Court have implied some rights, this is a 
precarious approach to rights protection. A Bill of Rights that granted rights and 
freedoms to everyone would be a non-contentious way in which to ensure some 
Indigenous rights protection. Public discussion needs to be focused on whether we 
should have a constitutional or a legislative Bill of Rights. A legislative Bill of 
Rights could be viewed as an interim step towards a constitutionally entrenched 
Bill of Rights.6   
 
A Non-Discrimination Clause: Such a clause could enshrine the notion of non-
discrimination in the Constitution. Such a clause must also adhere to the principle 
that affirmative action mechanisms aid in the achievement of non-discrimination.  
 
Specific Constitutional Protection: An amendment could be made to include a 
specific provision. In Canada, a comparable jurisdiction with a comparable 
history and comparable relationship with its Indigenous communities, the 
Constitutional Act 1982 added the following provision to the Constitution: 
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Section 35 (1): the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are 
hereby recognized and affirmed.  
Some of these steps to improve the Australian rights framework for Indigenous 
people—a Constitutional preamble, a Bill of Rights—would have benefits for all 
Australians. This reinforces the point that comes out of the litigation in the Kruger case, 
namely, that many of the rights of Indigenous people that are infringed are not ‘special 
rights’ but rights held by all people. On the flip side, measures that protect the rights of 
all Australians will have particular relevance and utility for Indigenous people.  
III. Looking outside 
While I have, to this point, concentrated on Indigenous rights people and 
achievable within the existing structures of the state, I want to now turn to the arena of 
international law.  
With its agenda up until World War I of asserting claims of colonisation and 
negotiating disputes between colonial powers, international law developed as a 
Eurocentric body of law. This Eurocentrism was compounded by the agenda set by the 
(primarily European) world wars that moulded international law through European 
politics, European stability and European control over the world order. 
We, as Indigenous peoples, provided one of the greatest impetuses for the 
development of international law. It was in what is sometimes referred to as ‘the 
colonising period’ that Europeans relied on an international law—or rule of general 
understanding between states—to agree between themselves on the appropriate way to 
acquire colonies. Thus, the doctrines of ‘discovery’, conquest and terra nullius were all 
developed as norms and rules of international law during this period. All to the 
disadvantage of Indigenous peoples.  
International law may have been a tool to justify colonisation but colonised 
people, after World War II, adopted the rhetoric of international human rights law and 
sought to gain access to the institutions of the United Nations to assert claims of 
sovereignty, autonomy and the protection of human rights. Much of the assertions for 
independence and recognition of Indigenous rights focused on the principle of self-
determination. And it is erroneous to think that we, as Indigenous people, have not 
challenged these assertions and then sought to rebut, counter or subvert the claims to our 
sovereignty and land that our colonisers have cloaked in the rhetoric of international law.  
The right to self-determination is recognised under international law in Article 1 
of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Although the right is clearly 
recognised in two of the canonical human rights instruments, there is much debate about 
the applicability and content of self-determination as it applies to Indigenous people.  
I would argue that we, as Indigenous peoples, do not need to feel confined by the 
semantic debates under international law. Rather, the key to the way forward is in the 
concepts and rights that we have implied into the terms ‘self-determination’ and 
‘sovereignty’ when we use those words to describe a vision of what we would like our 
communities to be like and the way we want to live our lives as Indigenous peoples.  
The rights enmeshed in the concept of ‘self-determination’ includes, I would 
argue, everything from the right not to be discriminated against, the rights to enjoy 
language, culture and heritage, our rights to land, seas, waters and natural resources, the 
right to be educated and to work, the right to be economically self-sufficient, the right to 
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be involved in decision-making processes that impact upon our lives and the right to 
govern and manage our own affairs and our own communities.  
These rights that can be unpacked from the concept of ‘self-determination’ point 
to a vision that has been described as internal self-determination. It sees increased 
Indigenous autonomy within the structures of the Australian state. The challenge to 
Australia is to alter our institutions to incorporate that vision.  
This debate shows the way that international concepts can be transformed and 
take on new meaning in the domestic political sphere for the furtherance of rights 
protections in a way that is not reliant upon active international intervention. 
Having said that, it is important to make the following point about Indigenous 
participation at the United Nations, and that is that Indigenous peoples have understood 
how the international arena can provide a springboard for substantive changes that will 
allow greater respect for the rights of Indigenous peoples within our own states.7 
Some avenues for action by individuals have opened up in recent times in relation 
to the human rights covenants. For example, if a state has signed the optional protocol to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights it opens an avenue of redress for 
an individual who claims state violation of their individual rights under that instrument. 
Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women is 
developing a similar mechanism.  
In the absence of rights protection in the Constitution, it is the reporting and 
monitoring mechanisms under international law that have created the most effective 
method of monitoring human rights in Australia. A recent example of this role can be 
seen in the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination. In 2000 it issued a report critical of Australia and claiming that our 
country, and our government, had failed to meet certain obligations that we, as a nation, 
have agreed to uphold under the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination.8 The Committee’s report expressed concern about the absence of any 
entrenched law guaranteeing against racial discrimination, provisions of the Native Title 
Amendment Act of 1998, the failure to apologise for the stolen generations and its refusal 
to interfere to change mandatory sentencing laws.  
The Federal Government’s response to the report is to be noted as it signals an 
emerging resentment towards external monitoring of human rights standards. The 
Howard Government’s response to the report was one of outrage, which labelled the 
report unbalanced and unfair. They rejected the notion that we are bound by the United 
Nations and asserted that a country like ours is capable of looking after our own affairs. 
They added sincerely that we have a good record on human rights, especially compared 
to other countries in our region. This comparison with worse human rights violators to 
negate international scrutiny of Australia promotes a method of assessing human rights 
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standards against worst practice rather than aspiring to best practice.  
I would assert, however, that it is precisely because our domestic arena contains 
so few avenues of rights protection that we will need to rely on the developing norms and 
standards of international law in order to hold governments accountable for their actions. 
This antagonism towards outside interference in domestic matters stands in stark contrast 
to the internationalisation of trade policy and the embrace of neo-liberal economic policy 
that has seen increased interference with domestic matters through trade agreements. 
This neo-liberal economic regime is also a challenge to Indigenous human rights. 
It is an economic regime unsympathetic to the cultural concerns and specific historical 
and contemporary legacies facing Indigenous communities as a result of the colonisation 
process. The cold rationale of neo-liberal economic policy impacts most heavily on 
sectors of the community that are vulnerable to economic shifts—and the Indigenous 
community is perhaps the most vulnerable of these. The erosion of hard-won workers 
rights, the erosion of land rights, degradation of the environment which leads to a loss of 
cultural heritage and the lack of protection from the agenda’s of multinational 
corporations are just some of the signs of this vulnerability. 
III. Looking inside 
I want to conclude by reflecting upon three lessons from the Indigenous 
experience under the Australian Constitution:  
• The protection of Indigenous rights does not occur in a lineal progression. 
There is often an assumption that as time goes on, rights protections will 
gradually improve. Recent experience in Australia should highlight the fact 
that rights that have been recognised in the past—native title and heritage 
protection—can be extinguished. So it is more accurate to view Indigenous 
rights—and indeed rights in general—as something that has high and low 
water marks. It is an important observation in terms of strategy as it means 
more diligence must be exercised in the way which gains in protection are 
made at moments of increased support for these issues.  
• The Constitution is just one arm of a strategy for rights protection. Rights 
must be placed in a respectful environment so any constitutional agenda 
needs to be matched with legislative political and educational strategies about 
rights protection.  
• We have yet to have a moment of inclusive nation-building. These issues of 
reconciliation, treaty and self-determination will remain recurring themes on 
Australia’s domestic agenda until there has been some step to counter the 
exclusion of Indigenous peoples from the creation and development of the 
modern Australia nation-state.  
The way forward is one that moves away from the zealous embrace of neo-liberal 
economic policy and instead seeks to match economic sustainability with the protection 
of fundamental rights. It is a model that measures quality of life by considering and 
valuing non-economic factors such as cultural heritage and environmental protection 
alongside the economic factors that are taken as indicators of our performance.  
Indigenous people can offer this aid to a better and fairer Australia: if laws, 
institutions and policies do not work for us, the most vulnerable, socioeconomically 
disadvantaged cultural minority in the country, they are not working. We are the litmus 
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test, not the special case. This test for our performance as a nation would move 
Indigenous people from the periphery, where we stood at the moment of federation, to the 
centre, where we need to be to ensure that Australia’s nation building processes become 
inclusive. This is the role we need to have in Australia’s political, legal and psychological 
life to ensure we move from a neo-colonial to a post-colonial Australia.  
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